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I. LOOKING GOOD ON PAPER 
A. The Top Ten 
What are these laws that look good on paper? My Top Ten is on most 
lists,1 with an exception here and there.2 They are: 
                                                                                                                           
 ∗ Douglas M. Costle Chair Visiting Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, Fall Semester, 
2009; Stimson Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washington School of Law, 
Seattle, Washington, (206) 543-5182, whr@uw.edu. With appreciation to my colleagues at Vermont, 
especially including Jack Tuholske, Pat Parenteau, Stephen Dycus, John Echeverria, Marc Mihaly, Craig 
Pease, David Mears, Cheryl Hanna, Tseming Yang, Jett Vaden, Jeff Shields, Ginny Burnham, Michael 
McCann, Christine Ryan, Dorothy Heinrichs, and Mark Latham. 
 1. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 70 (2004); KARL BOYD 
BROOKS, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE DAMS: THE HELLS CANYON HIGH DAM CONTROVERSY (2006). For a 
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS OF THE 1970S:  
THEY LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER 
2 VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [VOL. 12 
1969: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
1970: Clean Air Act (CAA) 
1972: Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
(CWA) 
 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 
 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
1973: Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
1976: Magnuson Act (Fisheries) 
 National Forest Management Act (NFMA) 
 Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA) 
1980: Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund). 
These acts of Congress are quite different in many ways. NEPA is a 
comprehensive environmental study law imposed upon agencies of the 
federal government. There are three “media” protection laws—the CAA, 
the CWA, and RCRA (a land protection law with wastes tracked “cradle to 
grave,” so they said). FACA is a public disclosure law, which extended the 
Freedom of Information Act. Two resource “planning and management” 
laws are part of the package: the Magnuson Act, now Magnuson-Stevens 
for fisheries and NFMA for forests. Finally, there is one liability law, 
CERCLA. 
B. Why Did They Look Good on Paper? 
What were the pin-up qualities that made these laws look good on 
paper? What were the features sponsors bragged about or critics deplored? 
                                                                                                                           
symposium on statutory interpretation and environmental law, see David L. Shapiro, Foreword: 
Statutory Dilemmas in the Regulation of the Environment, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 292 (1996). 
 2. See R.V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 91–
93 (6th ed. 2009) (providing a “Chronology of Significant Federal Environmental Legislation” 
consisting of eleven statutes, adding Ocean Dumping Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and TSCA; omitting FACA, Magnuson Act and MMPA); 
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and 
Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009–11 (1994). 
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How were they understood and described at the time of legislative birth? 
What was thought to be new, different, and better? We know some of these 
things about all of these laws.3 
I’ll exercise editorial judgment and declare four common features of 
these revolutionary laws to be the most conspicuous displays of merit and 
excellence. These are (1) best science, (2) public participation, (3) effective 
and aggressive judicial review, and (4) citizen enforcement. 
C. What Kinds of Endeavors Look Good on Paper But Fail in Design, 
Purpose, Function, or Outcome? 
There is, of course, a huge literature on human endeavors that did not 
work. 4  Bridges and trains fail, oil wells fail, and laws fail too. I’ve 
borrowed from one of these studies5  to develop a general typology on 
Modes of Failure that haunt human endeavors. There are, of course, 
conspicuous differences between building a durable bridge and writing a 
creditable law. Bridge-builders do not have colleagues who are hoping for a 
rapid collapse. They are not dealing with the corrosive forces of human 
intellect that work to defeat their prudent designs. But there are 
commonalities. Bridges and laws both have futures, and they both have 
design features that will be put to the test. 
So what are the recurring risks for human enterprises that looked good 
on paper? 
1.  Double-Edged Sword (illustrated by the Davy Crockett Nuclear 
Bazooka) 
This is a design defect that can be exploited by adversaries of the 
enterprise. 
2. Unanticipated Consequences (illustrated by Kudzu) 
This is a design defect that renders the enterprise maladaptive for ends 
not adverted to. 
                                                                                                                           
 3. For a useful contemporary perspective on Congress and the environmental statutes, see 
HENRY WAXMAN WITH JOSHUA GREEN, THE WAXMAN REPORT: HOW CONGRESS REALLY WORKS chs. 5, 
7 (2009). 
 4. E.g., DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING ERROR IN 
COMPLEX SITUATIONS (1996) (analyzing the process of failure, especially among individuals in 
positions of authority, through psychological experiments conducted via computer simulations with role-
playing volunteers). 
 5. IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE INVENTIONS, DESIGN DISASTERS, AND 
ENGINEERING FOLLIES (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
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3. Complexity (illustrated by “Smell-o-Vision”) 
This is a design defect that obstructs realization of ends that are well 
understood. 
4. High Maintenance (illustrated by World War I German Tanks) 
This is a design defect that hinders the enterprise from achieving 
adaptive response, acquiring new energies, and realizing successful 
outcomes. 
II. DESIGN DEFECTS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
A. The Double-Edged Sword: The Davey Crockett Nuclear Bazooka 
Here is our initial metaphor: 
In a way, from its very conception, the Davy Crockett 
Nuclear Bazooka was a classic military joke. The weapon 
was designed to fire a nuclear warhead a distance of 400 to 
600 meters. The joke came because the blast of the atomic 
warhead had a lethal radius of about 350 meters, or just 
over 1100 feet. It was quite possible to fire this weapon 
correctly and actually still be in the blast zone of the 
warhead. And yet, this weapon was actually put into 
production in 1962 and 400 were issued to troops. A 
desperation—read suicide—move, the weapon was only 
useful if you were going to be overrun, as was the fear in 
1962, by hordes of Russian tanks crossing into Europe. 
Fortunately none were ever used. 6 
Everything has uses it seems—and the Davey Crockett Nuclear 
Bazooka is no exception. 7  But the broader question is whether the 
environmental laws of the 1970s, designed to advance environmental 
causes, simultaneously undermined those causes by equipping their 
adversaries to do a better job. This outcome would be a true double-edged 
sword. Are there more than subtle prophesies of backlash and get-even 
                                                                                                                           
 6. Id. at 321–22. 
 7. Id. at 322 (“The highly secret weapons system did have one real distinction: it was a movie 
star. While still being classified top secret, some Davy Crocketts were deployed to Okinawa and, 
somehow, one Crockett, firing a standard warhead, appeared in a Godzilla movie. This was perhaps the 
only time it was fired in battle — well, sort of a battle. . . .”). 
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vengeances that rolled back the giant legal leap forward for the 
environment in the 1970s? 
There is much about law that has good-for-the-goose, good-for-the-
gander features. If the environmentalists invented the “hard look” doctrine, 
the technique is certainly serviceable to trade associations resisting 
environmental regulatory advances. If the environmentalists invented the 
use of FOIA and FACA for discovery purposes, the practice is relished, 
duplicated, and put to creative use by many industries. These industries 
may be far more effective advocates than the original inventors of the 
techniques. 
Certainly, the idea of the environmental impact statement has been 
appropriated and applied to actions not remotely environmental.8 But NEPA 
itself has remained steadfastly an environmental law, and those who would 
steer it in other directions have come up mostly empty-handed.9 NEPA’s 
adversaries certainly do not view the statute as a double-edged sword that 
helps them as much as it hurts them. Of course, the same could be said for 
the Endangered Species Act, even after Justice Scalia interpreted “best 
science” to mean “best economics” and read the citizen suit measure as 
affording “zone of interest” standing to those aggrieved by regulations 
aimed at helping the fish.10 
Laws, of course, are much more than a collection of directives; there is 
a culture that surrounds them. Professor Oliver Houck ably describes the 
culture of Public Interest Environmental Law that spawned these famous 
statutes of the 1970s and nourished the particulars that populated them 
(citizen suits, impact statements, petition processes, whistleblower 
protections, ready judicial review, etc.).11 Houck spoke up for the public 
interest as a regime where private interests did not go.12 Public interest 
lawyers would speak for the heretofore unrepresentedthe places, the 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See, e.g., W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY § 1:11 at 298–99 
(2005) [hereinafter LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY] (describing Cheney Energy Task Force urging an 
Executive Order requiring an EIS on any regulatory action “that could significantly and adversely affect 
energy supplies”). 
 9. Contra Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (expanding “zone of interests” in ESA 
citizen suits to include business interests objecting to so-called over-enforcement of environmental law). 
 10. This interpretive feat is described in William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA’s Insatiable Optimism, 
[2009] 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,618, 10,619 nn.16, 17 [hereinafter NEPA’s Insatiable 
Optimism]. 
 11. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1449 (1983–84) (“To restate 
the rationale: Public interest law provides access for unrepresented issues to the judicial system.  This 
statement has become the primary justification for public interest law practice, and in large part its 
definition.”). 
 12. See id. at 1544–45 (“If public interest has a meaning, it is as a value which transcends the 
places where private interests go. This is a meaning worth preserving.”). 
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creatures, and the processes that had no voice in the system. He describes a 
movement that was truly revolutionary because it multiplied, and realigned, 
constituencies and values too long missing from the U.S. public dialogue. 
Houck also captures the closest thing to a Nuclear Bazooka moment 
experienced by the environmental laws of the 1970s. This was the occasion 
when Public Interest Environmental Law opened offices on the other side 
of the street to become Private Interest Environmental Law.13 The event was 
marked by the famous 1971 Memorandum of Louis F. Powell (of the 
Hunton Williams law firm, and soon to be a member of the U.S. Supreme 
Court), which was prepared for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It was 
entitled “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” and it urged the 
establishment and promotion of “public interest environmental law firms”: 
This is a vast area of opportunity for the Chamber, if it is 
willing to undertake the role of spokesman for American 
business and if, in turn, business is willing to provide the 
funds. 
As with respect to scholars and speakers, the Chamber 
would need a highly competent staff of lawyers. In special 
situations it should be authorized to engage, to appear as 
amicus counsel in the Supreme Court, lawyers of national 
standing and reputation. The greatest care should be 
exercised in selecting cases in which to participate, or the 
suits to institute. But the opportunity merits the necessary 
effort.14 
This is the “reality” described by Lewis Powell and constructed by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It is the reality of public interest 
environmental law today. You always must look beneath the wrapper to 
discern the interest. You can’t be quite sure who this voice for the public 
interest is and what motivations are hiding there. 
Q. What is the goal of “And For the Sake of the Kids”?15 
A. To elect Brent Benjamin to the West Virginia Supreme 
Court so that the Massey Coal Co. might win a 
                                                                                                                           
 13. Houck, supra note 11, at 1454–1512 (exploring the work of the leading business public 
interest law firms including the Pacific Legal Foundation, National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 
Mountain States Legal Foundation, Mid-American Legal Foundation, and Southeastern Legal 
Foundation). 
 14. Id. at 1458. 
 15. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
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reversal of a judgment for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
concealment, and tortious interference. 
Q. What is a goal of the Washington Legal Foundation? 16 
A. To give legal support and voice to those who would 
“dry-lab” the testing of water pollutants and spread the 
falsified results. 
The public interest environmental laws were not designed to multiply 
and elevate the voices of business interests who are able to take care of 
themselves. They nonetheless got their foot firmly in the door. But few 
believe that business exploitation or mimicry of the environmental laws 
seriously undermines their purpose and function. 17  The creators of the 
environmental laws of the 1970s should be free of “Nuclear Bazooka” 
doubts. 
B. Unanticipated Consequences 
1. Kudzu and the Ignorance of Crowds 
This variety of failure of imagination is everywhere in the history of 
humans on earth.18 It is a small surprise that the condition might infect the 
design and application of the basic environmental laws. Let me offer but 
two examples from a rich pool of prospects. 
The rise of Kudzu in the United States is a splendid illustration of the 
motor power of collective ignorance:  
The plant was an instant hit among the gardeners who 
toured the Japanese Pavilion. By 1920 you could buy 
kudzu plants through the mail or at nurseries all over the 
South.  
. . . 
                                                                                                                           
 16. United States v. Hagerman, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 17. See Charles Eppig, Do Parasites Make You Dumber, 329 SCI. 131 (2010) (proffering the 
theory that children who must create more energy to fight off infection have less energy available for 
brain development). Similarly, a court or agency besieged by falsehoods and misrepresentations and 
phony fronts has less energy to devote to productive law-making. 
 18. See CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARILY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF 
CROWDS (Crowne Pub. 1980) (1841) (illustrating the concept that the wisdom of the crowd has been 
praised, but not always). 
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During the Depression, one of the ways in which the 
members of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) 
worked was to plant kudzu to prevent erosion. After all, the 
kudzu plants grew quickly and covered the areas with roots. 
The CCC even paid an incentive of eight dollars per acre 
planted with kudzu. By 1946 almost three million acres had 
been “conserved” with kudzu planted by the government 
and the vine could be found all over the South. It was ideal 
for this use, unless you ever wanted to use that land, and 
later any adjacent land, and a bit later most of the nearby 
land for anything else. . . . Kudzu is one of the fastest-
growing vines commonly found anywhere. It can spread at 
the amazing rate of a foot a day, and sixty feet a year is not 
unusual. And where it spreads, every other plant is gone, 
cut off from the sun and dead.  
[This “dead zone” now covers seven million acres across 
the Southern United States. Using the Japanese vine for 
erosion control looked good on paper . . . . And they 
planted it on purpose.]19 
2. Lead and the Expediency of Arrogance 
This variety of short-sightedness manifested itself as the eleven 
aqueducts of Rome drifted from one practical material (lengths of hollow 
tree trunks) to a cheap, ubiquitous, and attractive substitute—lead: 
Given that the toxic nature of lead was known, yet its usage 
was not banned or curtailed—an insanity in its own right—
it is highly likely that it wasn’t the descendants of the 
hordes of hairy and half-naked barbarians who brought 
down the empire. It was the Romans’ own inability to turn 
away from expediency and the easy option that damaged 
them from within. Then all it needed was a shove in the 
right place, and Rome fell, pipes and all.20 
                                                                                                                           
 19. Bill Fawcett, Overwhelming Success, in IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE 
INVENTIONS, DESIGN DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 17–18 (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
 20. Chris Powers, The Pipes of Rome, in IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE INVENTIONS, 
DESIGN DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 9 (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
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3. Unanticipated Consequence and U.S. Environmental Futures 
How have the U.S. environmental laws fared against the ravages of 
unanticipated consequence? For the most part, 21  they have escaped the 
historical verdict of unalterable stupidity that attends the choices to 
introduce Kudzu into the southern United States or to use lead in the 
aqueducts of Rome. But could these environmental laws of the 1970s be 
reenacted today? Serious doubt exists about that possibility. Certainly, at the 
moment of enactment the unassailable virtue of the environmental laws was 
the conviction that nobody wishes to live in a world of stinking waters, 
choking air, and disappearing life.22 That conviction was translated into a 
political “consensus” that embraced the goals of the environmental laws 
and limited the quarrels to the means.23 Perhaps, then, if any future was 
“unanticipated,” it would be one that deviated from a determined public 
protection of its quality environments. But conflict between environmental 
protection and economic development was never unanticipated. Rather, the 
passage of time has exposed a unique vulnerability of the U.S. 
environmental laws—the capacity to attract committed, resourceful, and 
determined opposition—not only over means but over goals as well. 
Environmental laws have become a subject of “love to hate” second only to 
the tax laws. Once again, Oliver Houck saw this coming before it became a 
full-blown unanticipated consequence. He quotes Justin Dart, of the Dart 
drugstore chain, in a discussion of the Pacific Legal Foundation: 
I loathe environmentalists . . . . I say we should preserve 
the redwoods, sure, maybe 100 acres of them to show the 
kids. Those environmentalists who talk about preserving 
wilderness in Alaska—how many goddamned bloody 
people will end up going there in the next hundred years to 
suck their thumbs and write poetry? . . . This country needs 
                                                                                                                           
 21. For exceptions, see Thomas Stratman, The Politics of Superfund, in POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 239, 259–60 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000) 
(finding that EPA generally spends Superfund monies in a cost-effective manner, but when politicians 
begin allocating funds money is not spent as effectively). 
 22. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 11 (1993) (discussing environmentalism as a social movement created in 
response to urban and industrial forces). 
 23. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER, at vi–vii (1986) 
[hereinafter 1 AIR AND WATER] (discussing “consensus” features of early U.S. environmental law). On 
the collapse of political cooperation on environmental issues, see Keith Schneider & Cornelia Dean, 
Stewart L. Udall, 90, Conservationist in Kennedy and Johnson Cabinets Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/nyregion/21udall.html? (quoting Tom Udall on Stewart: 
worrying that “we were losing the bipartisanship in the environmental area.” He urges his grandchildren 
to try “to transform our society to a clean energy and clean job society”). 
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the oil. If my country doesn’t come ahead of my view, then 
I don’t think much of my country.24 
Needless to say, to the extent this view gains traction, and it has, the 
environmental laws have an unhappy future. 
The environmental laws were better designed to address unanticipated 
environmental consequences than unanticipated economic consequences. 
NEPA, certainly, is a work of genius and is comfortably applied to any 
number of environmentally dangerous (not to mention unimagined) 
innovations.25 The Clean Water Act can reach nonindigenous species in 
ballast wastes,26 the escaping “bads” of aquaculture,27 and even runaway 
pesticides that the original designers left to future happenstance.28 Even the 
Clean Air Act can be put to service on the newly arriving environmental 
freight train called climate change.29 
Additionally, the environmental laws of the 1970s are loaded with 
research, reporting, monitoring, and information-yielding devices that have 
put environmental law in the front ranks of the pursuit of knowledge that 
has marked human civilization since the dark ages.30 
There is a difference, too, between “normal” and “truly pathological” 
unanticipated consequence. Adaptation to change is certainly a healthy 
aspect of the environmental laws of the 1970s. Seriatim amendment became 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Houck, supra note 11, at 1461. 
 25. Attempting to keep up with the kaleidoscopic NEPA case law is a personal pleasure for me. 
NEPA easily reaches just about everywheregenetic technology, breeder reactors, naval sonar, 
terrorism, wind power. See, e.g., Naturall Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 613 F.3d 76, 82 
(2d Cir. 2010) (discussing NEPA and pest-harboring, packaging materials used in global trade); see also 
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 586 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing NEPA and the largest landfill in the United States). 
 26. Compare KIM TODD, TINKERING WITH EDEN: A NATURAL HISTORY OF EXOTICS IN 
AMERICA 72 (2001) (ballast water and the zebra mussel), with Liwen A. Mah, Note, EPA Cannot 
Exempt Discharges of Ballast Water from the Clean Water Act’s Permit Requirements, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
757 (2005) (discussing the expansion of the CWA jurisdiction to ballast water discharges in U.S. 
waterways), and Liwen A. Mah, Note, Sailing by Looking in the Rearview Mirror: EPA’s Unreasonable 
Deferral of Ballast-Water Regulation to a Now Ineffective Coast Guard, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2004) 
(discussing the EPA’s initial refusal to regulate ballast water under the CWA). 
 27. E.g., U.S. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Atl. Salmon of Me., No. CIV.00-150-B-C, 2002 
WL 240440 (D. Me. Feb. 19, 2002) (recommending decision of Magistrate Kravchuk); cf. Wild Fish 
Conservancy v. U.S. EPA, No. C08-0156-JCC, 2010 WL 1734850 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2010) 
(approving ESA challenge to EPA decision approving exemption of Puget Sound salmon farms from 
general sediment-management standards). 
 28. See Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F.3d 188–89 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
trucks and helicopters used by a county to spray pesticides were point sources within the meaning of the 
Clean Water Act). 
 29. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). 
 30. See, e.g., 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 23, at 174–76; 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER 22–23 (1986) [hereinafter 2 AIR AND WATER]. 
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a regular response to a wide variety of “didn’t think of that” objections as 
new facts emerged and new opinions came forth. 31  Certainly bold 
environmental ambitions were rolled back and “frustrated” by the 
emergence of a variety of “second laws”—five-year permits that become 
twenty-year licenses,32 “new source” rules defeated by old-source gaming,33 
“stringent” statutes undermined by truly devious “nonenforcement” 
policies, 34  not to mention empirical revelations of “unanticipated 
consequence” that should have been wholly anticipated if earlier design 
failures had been conceded. But these laws are certainly not stale, quaint, 
and out of date. The collapse of the New England fisheries might have been 
“unanticipated” by much of the world but it should have been completely 
understood by the legislative designers who ceded all powers to industry 
cartels.35 
C. Complexity; Too Many Moving Parts:  
Friction and Failure Built Into Implementation 
1. The Sword Pistol: Neither Fish Nor Fowl 
It was Napoleon Bonaparte who made famous the quote: “Never 
interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”36 This is why the 
proponents of peace must have stood by silently while two of the great 
weapons of war were dismantled simultaneously in a grotesque and greedy 
experiment to combine the virtues of both. This effort to capture the killing 
virtues of each succeeded in nullifying the lethal capacities of both.37 This 
sword pistol (circa 1800) was a grotesque combination of clumsy pistol and 
useless sword.38 If you used the sword first, you would knock the powder 
                                                                                                                           
 31. 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 23, at preface. 
 32. See generally 2 AIR AND WATER, supra note 30, § 4.28 (detailing variances, exemptions, 
and escape-routes). 
 33. E.g., The Forum: Is It Time to Retire Grandfather?, 17 ENVTL. FORUM 42 (2000). 
 34. Tarah Heinzen, Essay, Stopping the Campaign to Deregulate Factory Farm Air Pollution, 
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1482, 1506–07 (2009). 
 35. On the collapse of the New England Fisheries, see generally MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1998) and CALLUM ROBERTS, THE UNNATURAL 
HISTORY OF THE SEA ch. 15 (2007). Josh Eagle points out that the Fisheries Conservation Act (formally 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Management Act) has never been anointed by inclusion in the West’s 
Annual Annotation of Federal Selected Environmental Law Statutes. Magnuson-Stevens, of course, is an 
environmental law, and an important one. It is just not a very good one. 
 36. Bill Fawcett, The Sword Pistol, in IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE INVENTIONS, 
DESIGN DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 20 (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
 37. Id. at 20–21. 
 38. Id. 
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out of your pistol.39 If you used the pistol first, you didn’t have time to flip 
the blade forward and lock it into place.40 It was therefore useless as a 
sword. 
This monstrosity has “Defense Department Acquisition” written all 
over it.41 
2. Too Many Moving Parts: Smell-O-Vision 
Another version of complexity is a misguided effort to wed odors with 
the visual images of film. The experiment was called “Smell-O-Vision.”42 It 
happened this way: 
[Odors, foul or sweet, have been slow to find a home in 
movie theatres.] But, finally, in 1960, one film made a 
serious attempt to involve audience noses in the movie 
experience. The film, called Scent of Mystery, included 
some thirty different smells released at each seat in 
synchronization with the projector. This patented device — 
surely the inventor was drooling at the prospects of his 
imminent profits — was called Smell-O-Vision. 
Unfortunately, Smell-O-Vision, in practice, simply stank. 
The odors came out too late or too early, sometimes with 
overpowering strength, at other times so faint that viewers 
were forced to sniff loudly as they vainly sought the next 
clue. The early reviews were terrible, and the movie a 
complete flop. Mike Todd, Jr., wouldn’t be able to produce 
another movie until he made The Bell Jar more than 
nineteen years later. 
And theater-filling Smell-O-Vision would never stink 
again.43 
                                                                                                                           
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. For other examples, see id. at 153, 281 (“Unlike most winged failures, the F-111 did serve 
long enough to redeem itself” and “No Plan Ever Survives Contact with the Enemy.”). 
 42. Douglas Miles & Donald Miles, Sr., Smell-O-Vision: Mixing Odors with Cinema, in IT 
LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE INVENTIONS, DESIGN DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 193 
(Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
 43. Id. at 195. 
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3. Complexity and the Environmental Laws 
Complexity is an oft-noted feature of the environmental laws.44 It has 
many sources and it hides many motives. There is a genuine side of this 
complexity, as the finer avenues of process obstruct the rush to discard 
dangerous technologies and out-of-favor business practices. There is a 
clumsy side of it, as please-all combinations (sword-pistol weddings, as it 
were) yield utter stalemate. For years, the mechanics of hazardous air 
pollutants were gummed up in this fashion.45 There are saboteur features of 
this phenomenon. Remember, many of the “designers” of the “sword 
pistol” called environmental law are striving to make the system not work. 
RCRA is famous for being a law of “mind-numbing complexity.”46 RCRA 
rules are a product of huge, laborious, and detailed rulemakings. These are 
then culled over by huge, laborious, and detailed appellate reviews in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that show signs of 
“selection” for immunities to the environmental laws. The study that should 
be conducted on RCRA is the extent to which “complexities” complained 
about are the product of drafting triumphs that could then be questioned 
collaterally.47 
Of course there is no rule that statutes serve as one-function specialists. 
A statute can prevent pollution, forbid its discharge, ban its accumulation, 
and regulate its underground management.48 But the sword-pistol error is a 
generic design flaw, and it gravely hurts EPA’s hazardous waste program 
                                                                                                                           
 44. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the 
Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 427 (1992) (illustrating the complexities of 
environmental laws regulating Superfund sites). For a serious and deft introduction to the science of 
complex systems, see MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2009). 
 45. See 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 23, § 3.20 (providing an early description of the 
mechanics of hazardous air pollution). 
 46. T.J. SCHOENBAUM & R.H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND READINGS 703 (Foundation Press 3d ed. 1996); see C.R. JOHNSTON, W.F. FUNK & V.B. 
FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 421 n.6 (2005) (noting that the details of RCRA’s 
“land ban” program, enacted by the HSWA of 1984, “are far too complicated to be treated in an 
overview course”). 
 47. A candidate for this sort of self-destruct mechanism is the inclusion of “discarded material” 
in the definition of “solid waste.” Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006). This 
is read by Judge Kenneth Starr in American Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
to preclude EPA from regulating dangerous materials held for reuse where there is no intent to throw 
something away. Most observers might explain this case not as an example of “poor” or “complex” 
drafting but as opportunistic or destructive judging. The case law is summarized and presented in 
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 2, at ch. 4. Another candidate for a judicial “murder” is the extremely hard 
look taken at the asbestos ban rule by Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
This appears to have let the air out of the TSCA balloon once and for all. 
 48. See Solid Waste Disposal Act § 9001, 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (2004) (addressing the regulation 
of underground storage tanks). 
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whether the mistake was the product of legislative error or judicial or 
administrative sabotage. 
Complexity has a dark side. It affords niches for exploitation by gaming. 
It allows derailing of well-grounded policy. It spreads knowledge thin. It 
moves compliance from a simple matter of good will to a complicated 
matter of good lawyers. It tempts courts to quit the inquiry and defer to 
anyone who pretends to navigate the confusion. 
One of the easiest routes to hideous complexity comes courtesy of 
constitutional necessity. Few doubt that the Supreme Court’s rulings on 
standing have added inordinate transaction costs to the practice of 
environmental law.49  Pointless discovery, even day-long depositions, are 
now the norm. All in the interests of constitutional necessity, we are told, 
although we understand that the guiding motivation is to roll back the 
ambitions of judicial review.50 
Generally, the common law is free from awkward combinations and the 
many moving parts that creep into statutory schemes. The environmental 
laws of the 1970s looked good on paper because they frequently settled on 
“common law” approaches in their basic design. The leader of the pack in 
this regard is the famous section 107 of CERCLA.51 Section 107 is little 
more than a striking declaration of strict liability. This idea was transported 
to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,52 and it is firmly behind the many billions 
in liability that will attend the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Oil Well Blowout.53 
The common-law “bias” of the principal environmental statutes is 
conspicuous in other ways. It is evident in the several savings clauses,54 the 
                                                                                                                           
 49. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009). 
 50. Antonin Scalia’s “appoint me if you dare” article appears as The Doctrine of Standing as 
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). The tactic was 
successful. They dared to appoint this man to the U.S. Supreme Court and he did as he said he would in 
this law review article. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006); see Christopher J. Nowicki, A Step Back from Chevron? An 
Analysis of Kelley v. EPA, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 221, 234 (1995) (discussing the status of 
administrative deference following Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).  
 52. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1002, 33 U.S.C. § 2702; see Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1003, 
33 U.S.C. § 2703 (describing “Defenses to liability” as limited to an act of God, act of war, and “act or 
omission of a third party”). 
 53. Clifford Krauss & Elizabeth Rosenthal, The Price and Who Pays: Updates from the Gulf, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/us/13q-n-a.html; see Seattle Times 
News Services, New lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 2010, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2012155857_oil19.html (describing a “maximum 
penalty” lawsuit by the Center for Biological Diversity; at $4300 per barrel, BP’s liability is calculated 
to be $19 billion, which would go to the U.S. Treasury). 
 54. Clean Air Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 7610 (2006); Clean Water Act of 1972 § 510, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1370 (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006). 
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prohibition on “open dumping,” 55  the “imminent endangerment” 
innovations,56 and the authorization in section 106(a) of CERCLA to issue 
administrative orders “as may be necessary to protect public health and 
welfare and the environment.”57 
Some “complexities” are necessary in the assemblage of any legislative 
engine. Major circuit-breakers appear in most statutes between matters of 
day-to-day administration and the more dramatic moments of enforcement. 
When this system fails, it is not necessarily because of an awkward 
combination of functions (the sword-pistol) or because of too many moving 
parts (Smell-O-Vision). It is because “normal” legislative design and 
practice allows commendable management to be driven onto the rocks by 
opportunistic enforcement.58 
D. High Maintenance 
Human endeavors that require high maintenance are vulnerable in the 
long run. The longer the list of needs, the higher the demands for help. 
Laws differ in their capacities for self-sufficiency and extreme dependency. 
Popular support is but one barometer. This proposition will be twice 
illustrated. Consider: 
1. The Great Wall of China 
The Great Wall seemed to be a dubious enterprise. It was a pit for the 
swallowing of resources. Could you make it long enough? For that matter, 
could you make it high enough or strong enough? Consider: 
                                                                                                                           
 55. Compare Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 § 4005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a) (2006) 
(“[O]pen dumping of solid waste or hazardous waste is prohibited.”), with Solid Waste Disposal Act of 
1965 § 1004(14), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(14) (2006) (defining “open dump” to include any “facility where 
solid waste is disposed of” that is not a “sanitary landfill”). 
 56. Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984) (inviting citizens to correct 
incidents of mishandling of “solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment”); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) 
(2006) (noting administrator may bring suit to combat “solid or hazardous waste” disposal activities that 
“may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment”). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006). Compare A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in 
Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 217 (2004) (making the interesting point that 
the “survival” of environmental law “is more problematic than other areas of law because it is not an 
organic mutation of the common law, or more generally, the western legal tradition”). 
 58. For a modern record, see Ass’n Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(2-1 decision), upholding a sweetheart “settlement” agreement, thus inviting thousands of AFOs to 
escape enforcement in return for a few pretextual litanies. 
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[This wall was begun in 214 B.C. and completed in 1368 
A.D. under the Ming Dynasty.] The first problem was that 
even the dirt-packed Great Wall and its forts were 
expensive to maintain. This meant often they were not kept 
in repair or well manned. The second problem was that in 
1234 the Mongols invaded. The Great Wall was designed to 
keep out the steppe tribes, but not when they appeared as a 
well-organized army in great numbers. The Mongols barely 
paused at the Wall before invading China. Eventually all of 
China, including the Great Wall, was controlled by the 
Mongols.59 
2. World War I German Tanks: Great Vehicle, Road Missing 
This is another tale of a nightmare in maintenance: 
[The reality of rough ground and deep trenches] seems to 
have been lost on the designers of the German [A7V tank]. 
The 26- by 10- by 11-foot tank held six machine guns and a 
57 mm gun that was quite sufficient for blasting apart those 
annoying machine gun nests. What this vehicle also had 
was a ground clearance of 1.5 inches. Yep, that is not a typo, 
the distance between the bottom of the tank and the ground 
was a tiny inch and a half. This meant that the entire 
bottom of the tank constantly ground itself against the dirt 
and debris below it except when running on the smoothest 
and firmest flat surfaces. (Maybe the German tank testing 
area was paved.) That scraping in turn meant the A7V was 
slowed to a crawl and was often stopped by even shallow 
depressions. There being a lack of fully paved battlefields 
in World War I, the Germans found that their new and 
expensive tank was effectively incapable of actually 
reaching the enemy and could not keep up with even 
walking infantry on an unpaved road. The program was 
dropped after only twenty of these awkward giants were 
made.60 
                                                                                                                           
 59. Bill Fawcett, The Great Wall of China, in IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE 
INVENTIONS, DESIGN DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 10, 11 (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
 60. Bill Fawcett, Tanks a Lot, in IT LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER: BIZARRE INVENTIONS, DESIGN 
DISASTERS, AND ENGINEERING FOLLIES 293, 294 (Bill Fawcett ed., 2009). 
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3. The Maintenance “Preadaptations” of Environmental Law 
A “preadaptation” is a design feature that facilitates survival in future 
environments.61  The more flexible these preadaptation features, the less 
emergency future maintenance will be necessary. These features-of-the-
future are the pillars of modern environmental law and they looked good on 
paper. They are four in number. They are the legislative commitments to (1) 
the best available science, (2) public participation, (3) effective judicial 
review, and (4) citizen suits. 
These four foundations frame the origins and values of modern 
environmental law. The “science” commits us to fuller understandings of 
the natural world and deeper sympathies to the living creatures within it. 
The “public participation” captures the tremendous diversities of 
environmentalism that were practiced by aboriginal groups, sought after by 
activists of the labor movement, put to good use by “conservationists” who 
left us the public lands, and renewed by the many tentacles of contemporary 
“environmental justice.” The all-important business of “judicial review” 
was the salvation of the civil rights movement and it afforded a quiet 
confidence and settled conviction that justice could have its way in the long 
run. And the “citizen suits” are the means to the end of environmental 
justice. Activism must have a method and these “suits” were the way to 
reward the fury of purpose and preparation that people would bring to the 
protection of environmental values. 
a. Best Available Science 
Linking protection of the environment to the pursuit of excellence in 
science was an extraordinary measure of good fortune. The Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) was founded in 1967 on an “advancement of science” 
platform and it poured its biology-strong expertise into information-starved 
agricultural forums beginning with the Wisconsin DDT Hearings.62 This 
jump-start on “science matters” was naïve in one sense. EDF-ers really 
                                                                                                                           
 61. See DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 6 (W.F. Bynum et al. eds., 1981) (defining 
“adaptation” to include being suited “to the process of adjustment to new conditions”). On the 
“starvation” of agencies by funding shortfalls and the rise of the “battered agency syndrome,” see RENA 
STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2010). 
 62. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Persistent Problem of the Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in 
Environmental Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 567 (1970); see also Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? 
The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2009) (highlighting the 
inconsistencies between science and the law.); SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE:  HOW SCIENCE 
CAN DETERMINE HUMAN VALUES (2010). 
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didn’t look past the conviction that “speaking truth to politics” could only 
help improve the situation. The momentum of that initial “science first” 
campaign was the beginning of the end not only for DDT, but the entire 
class of chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides.63 This optimistic initiative has 
had worldwide positive consequences for human understanding of 
persistent organic pollutants.64 
Following the initial “science first” campaign, science quickly gained a 
foothold in the other environmental laws. The National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) is a “science first” law and is written in full praise of the 
“ecological sciences.”65 It puts science—in particular, the life sciences—
into the mandates of all federal agencies.66 The “best available science” 
clauses appeared first in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
(MMPA) (twelve of these clauses are recorded there).67 Another eight came 
into play with the 1973 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).68 Even the 1976 Magnuson Fisheries Conservation Act was bitten 
by the “best science” bug, though the dominant message of that cartel-
building law is to invite fisheries interest groups to run their own affairs.69 
Linking protection of the environment to the “best available science” 
looked good on paper and has proven durable in practice. Being on the side 
of science is being on the side of the pursuit of truth, the praise of 
knowledge, the hope for improvement, and the advancement of learning. 
Science, it is now said, sparked the rise of political democracy and 
undergirds the free inquiry celebrated today in U.S. politics.70 
                                                                                                                           
 63. See MARK L. WINSTON, NATURE WARS: PEOPLE VS. PESTS (1997); WILLIAM CRONON & 
THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT, SILENT SPRING, AND THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (2008); DONALD 
ROBERTS AND RICHARD TREN, THE EXCELLENT POWDER:  DDT’S POLITICAL AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORY 
(2010). 
 64. THEO COLBORN, DIANE DUMANOSKI, & JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR STOLEN FUTURE 
(1996). 
 65. See LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 8, at 382–86 (quoting National Environmental 
Policy Act § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (2006), which urges the resort to a “systematic, 
interdisciplinary approach”). 
 66. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (2006). 
 67. COMM. ON DEFINING BEST SCIENTIFIC INFO. AVAILABLE FOR FISHERIES MGMT., OCEAN 
STUDIES BOARD NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE USE OF THE “BEST SCIENTIFIC 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE” STANDARD IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 30 (2004). 
 68. Id. at 17. 
 69. See Roger Fleming, Peter Shelley & Priscilla M. Brooks, Twenty-Eight Years and 
Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 579 
(2004) (examining the state of New England federal fisheries thirty years after the passage of the 
original Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) and the implementation of recent amendments to the MSA); see 
also Allison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas 
Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1999) (discussing the effects of fishing quotas under the MSA). 
 70. TIMOTHY FERRIS, THE SCIENCE OF LIBERTY: DEMOCRACY, REASON, AND THE LAWS OF 
NATURE (2010). 
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Do opponents of the environmental laws have any side-of-the-angels 
answers to outcomes driven by the best available science? Not really. It is 
often said that “our science is better” or “science is trumped by policy” or 
“there is no science on this topic.” But even sweeping movements (the 
“junk science” campaign)71 and powerful defensive opportunities (Daubert 
motions to strike or limit expert testimony)72 suffer in the long run because 
their answer to “science says” is “science says otherwise.” Frankly, who is 
embarrassed when attorneys for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 
and the General Motors Corp. make a Daubert motion in a climate change 
case to strike the testimony of Dr. James Hansen, preeminent climate 
scientist of the times and Director of the Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies? It certainly was not Dr. Hansen. It was the people who wanted to 
shut him up.73 
Lawyers are the first to say that “science” is but one input into a 
broader policy domain.74 But the clearer and stronger the science, the harder 
it is for policy-makers to go against it. These things are done, of course, but 
                                                                                                                           
 71. E.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1993); 
TODD WILKINSON, SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICIANS’ WAR ON NATURE AND TRUTH (1998). 
For a strong argument that scientific “doubt” is an attractive justification for decision-avoidance, see 
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1615–17 
(1995) (illustrating the double-edged sword features of “best science” approaches). 
 72. Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 4 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253 (2008). 
 73. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
313–20 (D. Vt. 2007) as discussed in William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Anna T. Moritz, The Worst Case and 
The Worst Example: An Agenda For Any Young Lawyer Who Wants to Save the World From Climate 
Chaos, 17 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 296, 297–304 (2009). 
 74. For thoughtful analyses of the confluence between science and law, see Beth C. Bryant, 
Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, and Management in the Steller Sea Lion Controversy, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 171, 200 (2009) (“Exposing the fact that an agency has made policy choices based on an 
incomplete scientific record leaves the agency vulnerable to charges of unjustifiable over- or under-
regulation.”), Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting 
Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1360 (2004) (“Embedded within any bare claim that a policy 
decision is ‘based on’ science, or that science ‘leads to’ a particular policy choice, will be some 
underlying normative position.”), and Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem 
Management and the Everglades: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 
501 (1996) (“[I]t is difficult to find references to any ecosystem scale adaptive management experiments 
that have not become embroiled in political controversy.”). 
On the problem of uncertainty and no readily available scientific answers, see Sanne 
Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 101–02 (2009) (quoting LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 21) (noting that science is not 
always able to provide certain answers and that “choosing to act on imperfect information is, therefore, a 
policy issue”). 
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the moments are better remembered for their shame than for their heroic 
visions of political independence.75 
In the long run, decisions resting on science are safer than those resting 
on anti-science. It may be front-page news that anti-Darwinists are joining 
forces with climate change deniers on the policy barricades. 76  But 
environmental advances face greater threats than rising coalitions of the 
ignorant. 
b. Public Participation 
This second pillar of the environmental laws of the 1970s is found in 
the texts and policies of the principal statutes.77 Not unlike the confident 
assumption that the “science is on our side,” this theme of “public 
participation” conveys a 1960s preachment that the “people are with us” 
and if they are heard, environmental decisions will take care of themselves. 
“Public participation” looked good on paper and has proven to be resilient 
and durable in practice. To this day, being locked out of the decision-
making process is an appealing claim in any environmental case. 
Opportunities to participate are at the heart and soul of procedural fairness 
and courts are quick to recognize this.78 
Statutory “public participation” has enormous supply-line 
reinforcement features behind itFOIAs, FACAs, public disclosure (Prop. 
65), whistle-blower laws and admirable NGO front-line combatants (e.g., 
GAP, OMB Watch, UCS) that have made “public participation” much more 
than a ritual. 
                                                                                                                           
 75. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 750–51, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(describing when industry committee allocates summer flounder fishery with a three percent chance of 
achieving overfishing target; NMFS approves a quota with an eighteen percent chance of meeting the 
overfishing target; the court says the standard should be at least fifty percent). Compare Ohio Valley 
Envtl. Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 648–49 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (noting 
expert testimony that over 30,000 stream and river restoration projects confirmed that stream creation 
“has not succeeded and is not scientifically credible”), with Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009) (accepting on faith a hearty pledge of “lake creation”). 
 76. Leslie Kaufman, Darwin Foes Add Warming to Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/science/earth/04climate.html?scp=1&sq=anti-
Darwinist,%20policy&st=cse. 
 77. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) 
(2006) (describing public participation in development, revision, and enforcement of any Clean Water 
Act regulation). For a version of public participation that should make a “true difference,” see Marc B. 
Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and 
Potential Solutions Through Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 155 
(2009–10). 
 78. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER 401–05 (1986) 
(detailing public participation provided in the NPDES program). 
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But history has conspired to make “public participation” something 
other than the unadulterated good advocates thought it to be in the 1970s. In 
ascending order of significance, I will mention the erosion of the radical 
environmental fringe, the loss of leadership charge against mainstream 
environmental groups, the rise of a chicanery front in the annals of public 
participation, and even the appearance of genuine doubts about the public 
and its sturdy wisdom. 
i. Outing the Activists and the Monkey-Wrench Gang 
Earth First! was founded in the early 1980s on the idea that a rise in the 
numbers and strength of radical environmentalists would leave the middle 
ground to the more moderate Sierra Club.79 Dean Kuipers describes this 
movement: 
During these years, before terrorism charges had any teeth, 
the radical [environmental] movement was a reporter’s 
dream: their commitment drove them to outrageous, often 
hilarious actions, and the public—who mostly assumed 
they were nonviolent hippies—treated them as more of a 
nuisance than a threat.80 
But then came September 11, 2001, and the coining of the term “eco-
terrorist” by Ron Arnold, James Watts’ biographer and father of the Wise 
Use Movement. 81  The 2001 PATRIOT Act defined “eco-terrorism” 
broadly82 and this definition “would become incredibly important in a surge 
of high-profile arrests and prosecutions that would sweep the movement.”83 
This was followed in 2006 by the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, which 
expanded the definition of “terrorism conspiracy.”84 
The developments are described by Kuipers: 
                                                                                                                           
 79. THE EARTH FIRST! READER: TEN YEARS OF RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM (John Davis 
ed., 1991); MARTHA F. LEE, EARTH FIRST! ENVIRONMENTAL APOCALYPSE, at ix (1995) (discussing the 
uniqueness of the Earth First! Movement). 
 80. DEAN KUIPERS, OPERATION BITE BACK: ROD CORONADO’S WAR TO SAVE AMERICAN 
WILDERNESS 5 (2009). On threats and harassment over animal research, see Greg Miller, A Civil 
Conversation About Animals in Research, 327 SCI. 1315 (2010). 
 81. KUIPERS, supra note 80, at 50. 
 82. Id. at 274 (quoting the Patriot Act definition of eco-terrorism: “the use or threatened use of 
violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by environmentally oriented, 
subnational groups for environmentally political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond that target, 
often of a symbolic nature”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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Beginning in August 2003, it became clear that Rod 
[Coronado] and his radical colleagues had lost the tussle 
over what was and wasn’t terrorism. That month, he gave a 
talk at a gay and lesbian center in San Diego for which he 
was later arrested. Rod had already served four years in 
prison for the Bite Back actions during the nineties, but 
when he reminisced on those days, U.S. attorneys decided 
his talk amounted to instructions for building incendiaries. 
No matter that no one actually made incendiaries, nor ever 
intended to—the speech alone was a crime. Worse, due to 
provisions in the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, it was terrorism. 
For his walk down memory lane, federal prosecutors 
threatened to put Rod in prison for as many as eighteen 
years under new terrorism sentencing enhancements. Very 
few people even knew this was possible. Rod certainly 
didn’t. He took a plea for a year and a day and was in jail 
while I wrote most of this. The word terrorism had finally 
caught up to him and the movement.85 
This year at the Public Interest Environmental Law Conference in 
Eugene, Oregon, I picked up a message from an unattended booth. It read: 
“Don’t Talk to the FBI.” This is a sad new twist in the world of 
environmental law. 
ii. Loss of Leadership Charge 
Those who accumulate power and influence must answer for their 
actions. Environmental groups are no exception. The policies that have 
come under criticism include mismanagement of lands these groups are 
supposed to save,86 choosing the thugs over the local communities in places 
they work around the world, 87  opportunistic political judgments with 
dreadful long-range environmental consequences,88 questionable selection 
of partners,89 enthusiastic embrace of contributions from the biggest and 
                                                                                                                           
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. See CHRISTINE MACDONALD, GREEN, INC.: AN ENVIRONMENTAL INSIDER REVEALS HOW 
A GOOD CAUSE HAS GONE BAD, at  xiii–xiv (2008) (commenting on The Nature Conservancy).  
 87. See id. at xiv (commenting on Conservation International). 
 88. See id. at xv (commenting on the Natural Resources Defense Council and noting that 
“[a]lthough the organization frowns on corporate sponsorship, NRDC was an influential force behind 
the U.S. environmental movement’s acquiescence to the North American Free Trade Agreement and 
subsequent trade agreements”). 
 89. Id. at xiv (commenting on the World Wildlife Fund and noting “[i]ts partners include 
mining, logging, consumer goods, financial services, high-tech, and large retailers”). 
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baddest polluters,90 and docile cooperation in every manner and form of 
greenwashing.91 Thus: 
[Environmental Defense (ED) or the Environmental 
Defense Fund] likes to call itself nature’s lawyer, but ED’s 
longtime president Fred Krupp is seen more as corporate 
America’s most effective mediator on environmental 
questions. ED won’t take money from oil, gas, mining, 
agricultural, forestry, fishing, heavy construction, and an 
array of retail, transportation, and telecommunications 
sectors. But it has conducted “projects” aimed at greening 
such companies as Federal Express, S.C. Johnson, and 
DuPont that critics say have allowed these companies to 
greenwash their images.92 
There is certainly something depressing about an apparent loss of 
purpose and conviction of the tried and true environmental groups. Richard 
Lazarus calls it the “graying of the green.”93 None of these groups have 
redefined themselves more dramatically than the Environmental Defense 
Fund that abandoned its reputation as science-firsters to become keeper of 
the chalice of cap-and-trade.94 This cap-and-trade business is now the lonely 
centerpiece of the climate change policy of the Obama administration.95 It 
starts with the heavy burden of historical failure under Kyoto.96 
But the environmental laws that looked good on paper are not about to 
expire because of drift and change within the leading environmental groups. 
My work is at the retail level, and there is much evidence there that the 
supposed loss of zest among established environmental groups is greatly 
overrated.97 New legions have appeared in impressive and forceful ways. To 
                                                                                                                           
 90. Id. at 98 (“Why are the dirtiest industries on Earth among the biggest contributors to 
conservation groups?”). 
 91. Compare MACDONALD, supra note 86, at 65, with MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 175 (1996). 
 92. See MACDONALD, supra note 86, at xv–xvi (commenting on the Environmental Defense 
Fund). 
 93.  LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 251. 
 94. Compare FRED KRUPP & MIRIAM HORN, EARTH: THE SEQUEL—THE RACE TO REINVENT 
ENERGY AND STOP GLOBAL WARMING (2008) (discussing the virtues of cap-and-trade), with Rodgers & 
Mortiz, supra note 73, at 321–24 (collecting some of the miseries of cap-and-trade). 
 95. See Tom Mounteer, Did Copenhagen Give Climate Change Legislation Any “Bounce” in 
the Senate?, 40 ENVTL. L. REPORTER 10,248 (discussing the Obama administration’s push for cap-and-
trade legislation post-Copenhagen). 
 96. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and 
Potentials, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008) (discussing the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 97. E.g., Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1320, 1330–31 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (demonstrating an 
unsuccessful challenge to PSD rule for NOx; Karen LeCraft Henderson is no friend of PSD but a good 
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mention the most obvious example, if environmental litigation is your game, 
the rise and work of the Center for Biological Diversity must be extolled.98 
In an extremely hostile political environment, the lawyers and scientists of 
this small band have made those environmental laws (chiefly the 
Endangered Species Act) continue to look good on paper. 99  They have 
shown that the creative and effective fervor that brought the environmental 
laws into being still burns brightly. 
iii. The Chicanery Front: Who is this “Public”? 
Any strategy of opening doors to “the public” runs the risk of the 
invitation being accepted by the unsavory, the unruly, the unwelcome, or 
the parasitic. But all forms of procedural due process or free speech are 
double-edged swords of this type. Oliver Houck’s refrain, when he 
complains about not knowing what you’re getting under the banner of 
“public interest environmental group,” is a common one.100 For the moment, 
perhaps for all time, we must treat the public as a series of startling and 
unopened gifts—wrapped in packaging called “And For the Sake of the 
Kids,”101  “The Washington Legal Foundation,”102  or “The Cooler Heads 
Coalition.”103 Environmental law has a long and skeptical familiarity on 
topics of superficial appearance, ranging over the spectrum of “green,” 
“sustainable,” “carbon-free,” and other self-congratulatory labels.104 
“Public participation” will not suffer from these ruses. All successful 
strategies are feasted upon by the mimics.105 Fakes aspire to be viewed as 
the genuine item because the genuine item enjoys credibility and respect. 
                                                                                                                           
try is made by ED in conveying the message); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 676 F. Supp. 2d 
307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (challenging EPA registration of insecticide spirotetramat including a 
commendable investigation into its effects on honeybees); 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 23, at Table of 
Cases, 1, 44–45 (Supp. 2010) (forty-seven case citations with Sierra Club as lead plaintiff; no evidence 
here of “resting on laurels”). 
 98. DOUGLAS BEVINGTON, THE REBIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM 
FROM THE SPOTTED OWLS TO THE POLAR BEAR (2009). 
 99. See LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 8, at Table of Cases, 1, 4–5 (Supp. 2010) 
(compiling twenty-six case citations with the Center for Biological Diversity as lead plaintiff). 
 100. See generally Houck, supra note 11 (discussing public interest law firms). 
 101. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
 102. United States v. Hagerman, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 103. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., CV-08-00138 SBA, 2008 WL 2951517 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008) (identifying the Cooler Heads Coalition as one of the anti-climate change 
front groups named in the conspiracy count of the complaint). 
 104. Compare HEATHER ROGERS, GREEN GONE WRONG: HOW OUR ECONOMY IS 
UNDERMINING THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION (2010), with ADRIAN PARR, HIJACKING 
SUSTAINABILITY (2009). 
 105. JANICE M. BENYUS, BIOMIMICRY: INNOVATION INSPIRED BY NATURE (1997). 
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Far more dangerous to environmental groups is the prospect of loss of 
influence at the “grassroots.” The Wise Use Movement poses a genuine 
threat to environmentalism in this regard.106 If you can win the “hearts and 
minds of the people” and “fill the room,” you matter in the world of “public 
participation.” Otherwise, you do not. 
iv. The Disdain-for-the-Public Movement 
Surely the most fundamental challenge to the “public participation” 
premise of the environmental laws is a questioning of the basic assumption 
that the “public” is an admirable influence that should be invited to 
undergird any worthwhile policy. Deep down, perhaps, is a rising concern 
among environmentalists that the “people aren’t with us anymore” in these 
hard economic times given the rising cynicism of the politics of the cyber-
age.107 The weaknesses of “public opinion” are suddenly on conspicuous 
display—too flighty, they say, too hard to measure, too vulnerable to 
manipulation, too easy to takeover by charlatans.108 
And now comes a flood of new books giving us another reason for 
wondering whether it was a dreadful mistake to link the future of the 
environmental laws to this unruly horse of “public participation.” That 
reason is that the public was—or is—terminally ignorant.109 
Is the world “going dumb” around us at some accelerated rate? I doubt 
it. I can even take a sympathetic view of this well known quotation (at least 
in environmental circles!) of this 1898 Declaration of the Cattlemen of West 
Texas: 
                                                                                                                           
 106. See DOWIE, supra note 91, at App. C (discussing “The Wise Use Agenda”). 
 107. E.g., ROBERT J. BRULLE, AGENCY, DEMOCRACY & NATURE: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT FROM A CRITICAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE (2000); L.K. CALDWELL, L. R. HAYES & I.M. 
MACWHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR ACTION (1976); Gottlieb, 
supra note 22, at ch. 4, 5 (illustrating the “yesteryear” quality to many of the books on environmental 
activism). 
 108. ROGERS, supra note 104, at 207 (explaining that the “current moment of environmental 
awareness is unprecedented” and therefore “precious” and “must not be squandered”). 
 109. SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON: DUMBING DOWN AND THE FUTURE 
OF DEMOCRACY 17 (2008) (“[A] fertile culture for the spread of invincible ignorance . . . .”); DAMIAN 
THOMPSON, COUNTER KNOWLEDGE: HOW WE SURRENDERED TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES, QUACK 
MEDICINE, BOGUS SCIENCE, AND FAKE HISTORY 2 (2008) (describing “a huge surge in the popularity” 
of the preposterous); CHRIS MOONEY & SHERIL KIRSHENBAUM, UNSCIENTIFIC AMERICA: HOW 
SCIENTIFIC ILLITERACY THREATENS OUR FUTURE 53 (2009) (“profoundly disheartening to see how far 
we have fallen”); MICHAEL SPECTER, DENIALISM: HOW IRRATIONAL THINKING HINDERS SCIENTIFIC 
PROGRESS, HARMS THE PLANET, AND THREATENS OUR LIVES (2009); Thomas Friedman, First Law of 
Petropolitics, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 25, 2006) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/04/25/the_first_law_of_petropolitics (describing a proposal 
that was the epitome of “dumb as we wanna be” politics). 
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Resolved, that none of us know, or care to know, anything 
about grasses, native or otherwise, outside the fact that for 
the present there are lots of them, the best on record, and 
we are after getting the most out of them while they last.110 
This is, on the one hand, an appeal to the benefits of “not knowing” and 
an expression of the single-mindedness of ruthless exploitation. But these 
folks, like many other hard-workers, may be only “too busy to know.” They 
certainly shouldn’t be excluded from the next public hearing on grazing 
restrictions. 
Through it all, “public participation” is a shining beacon of 
environmental law. It is, at once, an expression of confidence in the values 
collected under the environmental banner and the expression of a 
conviction that these values will never depart from the community psyche. 
Under the environmental laws, “public participation” is a game that all can 
play. But it is a game that the environment will win. It all looked good on 
paper. 
E. Effective Judicial Review 
At the extended birth of the environmental laws in the 1970s, there was 
an overriding conviction that the “science” would be right and the “public” 
would be supportive because the federal courts would make sure of it. The 
civil rights movement that preceded the environmental movement was all 
about a series of victories in courts, from top to bottom. Some moments in 
U.S. history used to be otherwise, young lawyers were told, but the federal 
courts were generally understood to be inseparable friends and allies of the 
environmental cause. 
Was this assumption a latent design defect that looked deceivingly good 
on paper? 
Certainly, turning down the amplitude of judicial review has been a 
mission of modern anti-environmentalism. Senator Orrin Hatch (R. Utah) 
has been the fire and brimstone missionary. Changing the housekeeper 
always has been the quickest way to change the rules of the house. A 
number of political agendas have gone into hiding under the judicial 
Orwellian-speak of “strict constructionism,” “plain meaning,” “original 
intent,” “judicial restraint,” and “deference” to political and executive 
branches. But the agenda to withdraw the support of the courts from the 
environmental laws has not been in hiding at all. It has been obvious, 
explicit, and menacingly successful. 
                                                                                                                           
 110. PAUL SHEPARD, NATURE AND MADNESS 1–2 (1982). 
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Why have the leaders of this counter-revolution (to replace effective 
judicial review with cursory judicial review) focused their antagonism and 
directed their creative spleen against the environmental laws? Because 
politically dangerous ideas of citizen suits, whistleblower protection, full 
disclosure, burdensome regulation, and product bans are hiding there. And 
economically dangerous land mines are everywhere in a suite of statutes 
that boast of zero pollutants, 111  land-bans, 112  best technology, 113  and 
universal technology assessment. 114  Besides, both Justice Powell 115  and 
Justice Scalia116 had told the world that the struggle for the U.S. economy 
and its technological future (conveniently described as environmental law) 
eventually would be settled in the courts. 
No single proposition has been more irksome to the assailants of 
environmental law than the idea that environmental values deserve a special 
protected status in court akin to the status of civil liberties.117 Of course, 
NEPA requires all agencies to consider environmental values throughout 
their decision-making despite contrary intonations in their legislative 
charters.118 And the little NEPAs do the same thing for the state and local 
agencies.119 But this consistently “troublesome” (to its opponents at least) 
rule of special status for environmental values found its legal voice before 
that in an opinion by Federal Power Commission (FPC) Commissioner 
Charles Ross.120 Ross invented the phenomenon that became oddly named 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“The 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”). 
 112. See 4 W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES & SUBSTANCES, 
§ 7.21 (1992) (describing prohibitions on the land disposal of hazardous waste). 
 113. See 2 W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER, § 4.28 at 411–21 
(Supp. 1992) [hereinafter 2 AIR AND WATER (Supp. 1992)] (discussing various formulations of “best 
technology” under the Clean Water Act). 
 114. This would be NEPA. See LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY , supra note 8, at 375–80. 
 115. See Houck, supra note 11, at 1458 (excerpting J. Powell’s memorandum on the concept of 
business-interest litigation). 
 116. Scalia, supra note 50. This struggle for the conscience, conviction, and loyalty of the 
federal judiciary remains intense and contemporary. See NEPA’s Insatiable Optimism, supra note 10 
(celebrating the fortieth anniversary of NEPA with a look at its successes); see also William H. Rodgers, 
Jr., Betty B. Fletcher: NEPA’s Angel and Chief Editor of the Hard Look, 40 ENVTL. L. REPORTER 
10,268 [hereinafter Betty B. Fletcher: NEPA’s Angel and Chief Editor of the Hard Look] (discussing the 
necessity of the judicial “hard look” doctrine). 
 117. William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under 
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 718–24 (1979). 
 118. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1969). 
 119. Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate 
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 79 (2008). 
 120. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 33 F.P.C. 428, 458, 463 (1965) (Ross, C., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (requiring the agency on its own motion to make sure that a 
full record is presented and that all alternatives are considered). 
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the “balls and strikes” doctrine. In the historic Storm King Mountain case 
on the Hudson River, Commissioner Ross roundly criticized the majority 
for sitting by passively, “like an umpire calling balls and strikes,” thus 
allowing the power company applicant to control the process, dictate the 
input, and mandate the outputdestruction of the mountain. Charles Ross 
said the fish and the river deserved the independent attention of the 
Commission even if the advocates thought otherwise.121 
None would forget that this upstart FPC Commissioner, who announced 
that agency decision-makers should not preside passively over organized 
plans to ruin the environment, would later join the staff of Senator Lee 
Metcalf of Montana. The so-called “populist” Senator Metcalf (with the 
help of Charles Ross) would be the chief engineer of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) of 1972,122 which would profoundly hinder (it can 
never be stopped) the manipulation of advisory committees to the ends of 
corporate and special interest advantage. Metcalf and Ross obviously 
believed that advocates before agencies who were sitting there “blindly like 
an umpire” in the group of manipulative advisors might be aided by the 
disclosure provisions of FACA. The “Ross conspiracy” became wedded to 
law in the famous opinion of Judge Paul Hays in Scenic Hudson (I).123 In 
holding that the Commission failed to consider alternatives and measures to 
minimize effects from a pumped storage project planned for the Hudson 
River, Judge Hays wrote: 
[T]he Commission has claimed to be the representative of 
the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an 
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries 
appearing before it; the right of the public must receive 
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the 
Commission.124 
The umpire metaphor was picked up and repeated by Judge Skelly 
Wright in his powerful Calvert Cliffs opinion,125 which took the Atomic 
                                                                                                                           
 121. Id. 
 122. Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), 5 
U.S.C.A. App. I, as amended Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247 (1976). 
 123. See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n (Scenic Hudson (I)), 354 F.2d 
608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) (setting aside order because the Federal Power Commission failed to compile a 
sufficient record to support its decision and failed to make thorough study of alternatives), cert. denied, 
384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[T]he primary responsibility for fulfilling [NEPA’s] mandate lies with the 
Commission. Its responsibility is not simply to sit back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary 
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Energy Commission to task for omitting from hearings environmental 
issues not raised by the parties.126 
This notion that a judicially discoverable “public interest” has life 
beyond the grasp of corporate litigants is disturbing to many who have 
made their plans. It makes environmental protection an ineradicable part of 
the agency mandate. It charges the courts with protecting the “special 
status” of environmental rights and preventing them from being swept away 
by the technicalities and vicissitudes of nonsense doctrines (e.g., laches or 
waiver) or out-of-tune burdens of proof. And it protects the courts 
(especially at the trial level) in endeavors to inquire, innovate, frame, and 
investigate. For the environmental cause the operative assumption is, the 
more courts know, the better; and the better they know it, the better the 
outcome will be for the environment. This is a version of “effective” 
judicial review or “activist” review. 
Not all share this view. At his confirmation hearings, John Roberts 
offered an opinion on what used to be known as the “balls and strikes” 
doctrine: 
[A] certain humility should characterize the judicial role. 
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other 
way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make 
the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a 
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the 
rules but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball 
game to see the umpire.127 
And through recent times, the Charles Ross-Paul Hays-Skelly Wright-
Lee Metcalf version of “special status” for environmental values has not 
become the guiding light it was meant to be. Instead, it has become the 
object of contempt would-be destroyers of the environment hoped it would 
become. This job of “reconstruction” is undertaken enthusiastically by the 
Honorable Carlos T. Bea, who turns another page on the special status of 
“environmental concerns”: 
                                                                                                                           
contentions at the hearing stage. Rather, it must itself take the initiative of considering environmental 
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process beyond the staff’s evaluation and 
recommendation.”). But see Scalia, supra note 50, at 884, 886 (aiming harsh criticism at the efforts of 
Paul Hays and Skelly Wright—two of the great champions of environmental law). 
 126. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1117–18.  
 127. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., 
appointee, Chief Justice United States Supreme Court).  
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I place the word in quotes because it may have acquired a 
special meaning in the context of environmental litigation. 
Where other litigants have “objections,” environmental 
groups seem to have “concerns.” This may imply the 
“concerned” possess a greater commitment, sensitivity and 
objectivity. Nonetheless, for our purposes, to have effect in 
litigation, “concerns,” like objections, must be voiced and 
justified, or be lost by doctrines of waiver and exhaustion 
of administrative remedies.128 
In their zest to deprive the “environment” of any unique or special 
status, the U.S. Supreme Court has ignored, undermined, or gone around 
the environmental values expressed in the environmental laws of the 1970s. 
In the process, environmental values are now on a par with, say, pastry 
manufacturing, except that the biscuit-makers are far better protected by the 
property theories. Committed and able federal district courts are pulled 
from the fray with reasoning that ranges from exaggerated praise of judicial 
ignorance of scientific matters (rephrased, “we are so dumb we shouldn’t 
intervene”)129 to falsified versions of the scientific record130 to sophomoric 
plain-meaning word games. 131  These raconteurs of the absurd are on a 
mission to destroy all environmental values, notably those articulated in the 
                                                                                                                           
 128. `Ilio`ulaokalani Coal. v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1102 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bea, J., 
dissenting opinion). See also Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 586 F.3d 735, 
751 (9th Cir. 2009) (Trott, J., dissenting), where Judge Trott articulates a “burdensome” objection to 
what would be the “largest landfill in the United States” on 4,654 acres of BLM lands on a former 
Kaiser Mining site near Joshua Tree National Park: 
What sane person would want to attempt to acquire property for a landfill? Our 
well-meaning environmental laws have unintentionally made such an endeavor a 
fool’s errand. This case is yet another example of how daunting—if not 
impossible—such an adventure can be. Ulysses thought he encountered fearsome 
obstacles as he headed home to Ithaca, but nothing that compares to the “due 
process” of unchecked environmental law. Not the Cyclops, not the Sirens, and 
not even Scylla and Charybdis can measure up to the obstacles Kaiser has faced 
in this endeavor. The record here exceeds 50,000 pages. 
Is this problem created by “well-meaning environmental laws” or a “well-meaning” proposal to put a 
4,654-acre dump in the desert? Or something else? 
 129. See Betty B. Fletcher: NEPA’s Angel and Chief Editor of the Hard Look, supra note 116, at 
10,274 n.78 (discussing the colloquy on the meaning of “troposphere” during the oral argument in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
 130. This is achieved by Chief Justice Roberts in Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 
365, 370 (2008), as discussed in Betty B. Fletcher: NEPA’s Angel and Chief Editor of the Hard Look, 
supra note 116, at 10,278. 
 131. The opinions in Rapanos v. Unites States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), are best summed up by 
Senior District Judge Robert Probst in United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249 n.5 (N.D. 
Ala. 2007) (“I will not compare the [Rapanos] ‘decision’ to making sausage because it would 
excessively demean sausage makers.”). 
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environmental laws of the 1970s. The Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) proudly vows to protect marine mammals with the rarest of 
exceptions.132 But the high court quickly dispenses with these animals.133 
NEPA vows a look-before-you-leap policy, 134  while the high court 
repudiates all precaution when it proceeds under the mantle of national 
security 135  or de-regulation. 136  The ESA pledges the protection of 
endangered species,137 but the high court says Congress really didn’t mean 
this when it was turning over the NPDES program to the good offices of the 
State of Arizona.138 Congress insisted 111 years ago that one should dump 
no “refuse” into navigable waters,139 and it repeated the admonition in the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.140 But the high 
court cleared the way for a mining company to bury a navigable lake 
because the tailings would look unsightly on nearby wetlands (rising higher 
than the Empire State Building). 141  After careful consideration and 
deliberate debate, Congress put “environmental values” into the charters of 
each and every federal agency.142 But the Supreme Court forgot to read 
this, 143  ignoring several of its own precedents, while declaring that 
environmental laws had nothing to do with any decision to allow thousands 
of dilapidated and polluting Mexican trucks to enter the United States.144 
Comedians noted it was easier for Mexican trucks to enter the United States 
than Mexicansperhaps because the former carried conspicuous and 
unarguable credentials of trade and economic activity, while the latter are 
perceived as an “environmental” menace. 
                                                                                                                           
 132. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 § 101(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (“There shall be 
a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal productions, 
commencing on the effective date of this chapter.”). 
 133. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 365, 365 (2008). 
 134. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 135. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 365. 
 136. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 137. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 138. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 139. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). 
 140. Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) 
(2006). 
 141. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009). 
 142. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (2006). 
 143. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., Crazy Horse, The Tenth U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
and Dissents Not Written—The Environmental Term of 2003-2004, 34 ENVTL L. REPORTER 11,033, 
11,034–35 [hereinafter Crazy Horse] (discussing U.S. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 
541 U.S. 752 (2004)). 
 144. This precedent can be found in three Supreme Court cases: Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic 
Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 778 (1976), Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 
145–46 (1981), and Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362–63 (1979). 
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Of the four great virtues of the environmental laws that looked good on 
paper in the 1970s (best science, public participation, judicial review, and 
citizen suits), the high court certainly does not let the “best science”145 and 
“public participation” 146  get in the way of its “strict constructionism” 
preferences. And it has undertaken a longand determinedcampaign to 
drive “citizen suits” into the legal wilderness.147 But the more significant 
and more dramatic changes occurred because the Supreme Court was able 
to lay its hands repeatedly and directly upon all sentiments bound up with a 
1970s understanding of “effective judicial review.” To many of the founders 
and supporters of the environmental laws, the device of judicial review 
looked good on paper when it meant active and intelligent review by a 
Skelly Wright, David Bazelon, Harold Leventhal, Patricia Wald, or Abner 
Mikva. But it doesn’t mean the same today because the script for judicial 
review is written by a different group of people who believe fervently in a 
“strict construction” of their own preferences. 
The “strict constructionism” practiced by the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the environmental laws of the 1970s is five parts deception and another five 
parts self-deception. It is neither strict nor constructionist. Self-denial and 
“humility” is supposed to be part of this pompous package, so we must shed 
our tears along with Justice Scalia as he rules against pockets of old growth 
throughout the forests of the North Cascades148 and as he sobs in frustration 
(his constitutional hands are tied after all)149 at his professional inability to 
loosen the strictures on resistors to climate change.150 We must believe that 
Justice Roberts is shaking with indignation because of the stress of his 
higher calling that insists he cannot relieve the agonies of the struggling 
whales151 or rush to save the failing domestic alfalfa industry.152 
We must sympathize with Justice Thomas because the law, strictly 
understood, has just obliged him (against his better judgment and quiet 
confidence) to destroy the economies of a number of struggling Indian 
tribes153 and to permit a cascade of polluting trucks to make their way 
                                                                                                                           
 145. See 2 AIR AND WATER (Supp. 1992), supra note 113. 
 146. See Crazy Horse, supra note 143. 
 147. See infra notes 161–169.  
 148. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009). 
 149. The Scalia standing agenda (which is now prevailing law) is completely laid out in his 
1983 law review article. Scalia, supra note 50.  
 150. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 550–52 (2007).  
 151. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 365, 370 (2008). 
 152. See generally Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010) (addressing 
the impact of genetically engineered seeds on the failing domestic alfalfa industry). 
 153. Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S.Ct. 1058 (2009). 
2010] The Environmental Laws of the 1970s 33 
across the southern United States landscape.154 We must commiserate with 
Justice Alito as he does his duty to send the birds to their doom in 
Arizona 155  and drain all legal value from the Apology Resolution that 
Congress wrote for the natives of Hawai‛i. 156  And we must give 
condolences to Justice Kennedy, whose sleepless nights are shredded by 
thoughts of the bulldozed wetlands157 and buried lakes158 he was obliged to 
put away. 
No good and common man could persuade himself that it was a 
commendable thing to kill whales and chop down trees in violation of law, 
to cheat Indians, and to deceive the natives of Hawai‛i, to bury lakes, and to 
stand aside while the birds are allowed to die. This sort of thing can be done 
only by men of great rectitude, character, and restraint. And don’t forget the 
ever-present “humility.” 
The environmental laws of the 1970s looked good on paper because 
they presupposed the enthusiastic cooperation of judges who would uphold 
declared environmental values within the ambiguous restrictions of 
legislative compromise. They assumed an unyielding embrace of the idea 
that the environment and its many services may not be made to succumb to 
casual inference or cryptic choice. They had a vision of active and 
aggressive judicial review. But this vision did not endure. It was replaced 
by something called judicial restraint, and this new vision would let 
environmental damage happen if it was justified, so as to look good on 
paper. 
F. Citizen Suits 
Environmental law has had its own constabulary since the earliest days 
of the environmental movement. Environmental lawyers were the first to 
seize upon the motto of “sue the bastards,”159 and their experiences were 
richly informed about which bastards to sue and in what order. 
                                                                                                                           
 154. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 773 (2004).  
 155. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007). 
 156. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S.Ct. 1436, 1443 (2009). 
 157. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(asserting that the majority should have remanded the case and instructed the Court of Appeals to apply 
the ‘significant nexus’ test to determine whether a wetland was a navigable body of water within the 
meaning of the Clean Water Act). 
 158. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009).   
 159. I have always associated Vic Yannacone, the first lawyer for Environmental Defense Fund, 
with this sentiment. Environment: Sue the Bastards, TIME, Oct. 18, 1971, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910111,00.html. 
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This tempestuous arrogance was rewarded and strengthened by the 
environmental laws of the 1970s. Enforcement was a necessary but elusive 
condition. Citizen enforcers were declared a good idea and many legislative 
moves were made to strengthen citizen hands in definition and 
application.160 
The Supreme Court has given citizen suits a calculated retooling that 
could only be done by a clique of idea-assassins. With a straight face, 
justices have taken great liberties with the doctrine of standing161 to hinder 
and annoy the enthusiasts who would make life difficult for polluters. 
Justice Scalia does not reluctantly discover constitutional barriers that stand 
in the way of these bright-eyed lawyers whose relentless energies have 
traced legal corrosion throughout the U.S. Forest Service. No, Justice Scalia, 
gleefully discovers a formidable stumbling block that could trip up these 
reformers. He sees it in the Constitution, though his hallucinations are not 
pre-advertised by any words in English found there.162 None of this matters 
to the opponents of citizen suits who will accept their ammunition from 
anybody in the businesswith all due “humility,” of course. 
To the impressive roster of “standing”—and sometimes “ripeness”163—
barriers the Supreme Court has used to clog the path to citizen suits, the 
Court has added unseemly and detailed attention to “notice” 
preconditions. 164  This is a “jurisdictional” necessity, the justices have 
said,165 and “notice” usually means an avalanche of detail fit for a proper 
defense. If the citizen survives the discovery and moves on to the merits, it 
will meet any number of “we-don’t-do-that-any-more” defenses. This is the 
infamous Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.166 
ruling of the Supreme Court, which rests on wholly-invented word games 
based on present-tense/past-tense, made-up definitions. If the citizen 
survives Gwaltney and actually wins the case, any award of counsel fees 
                                                                                                                           
 160. The first one—and thus the model for what follows—appeared in Clean Air Act of 1970 
§ 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen 
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000) (discussing the addition of the first citizen suit 
provision in the Clean Air Act of 1970). 
 161. It was a small group of law students that obtained standing in United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), as described in NEIL 
THOMAS PROTO, TO A HIGH COURT: THE TUMULT AND CHOICES THAT LED TO UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA V. SCRAP (2006). 
 162. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (declaring that “the 
requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute”). 
 163. The leader in this category is Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998). 
 164. For a representative sample, see Clean Air Act § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006) 
(describing notice requirement for bringing citizen suits pursuant to the Clean Air Act). 
 165. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989).  
 166. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987). 
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will be trimmed and confined by stingy and technical versions of legal 
victory.167 
Thus, this proud relic of the “citizen suit,” handed down by the 
environmental laws that looked good on paper, is bothersome to plead, 
obstructed by standing, richly defended, stifled in the remedy, and 
decidedly unprofitable. And still they come. 
III. CONCLUSION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS  
LOOKED GOOD ON PAPER BECAUSE THEY PROMISED  
A BETTER WORLD AND A HIGHER VIRTUE 
Retrospective criticisms of the environmental laws confirm that they 
did not meet the higher ambitions of their creators.168 The environmental 
agenda is glaringly unfinished, and it is topped by the climate change issue 
that is deservedly mentioned as the gravest challenge ever faced by human 
civilization.169 
Still, the environmental laws of the 1970s reached boldly, challenged 
deeply, and provoked the settled order profoundly. That they fell short is not 
necessarily attributable to drafting errors or failures of imagination. All 
statutes mark out a range of prospects and every goal achieved could have 
been otherwise. 
It is said, for example, that the “most glaring and inexcusable 
deficiency of modern environmental law is the apparent lack of 
governmental obligation to protect natural resources.”170 But this obligation 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 600 (2001). 
 168. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at xiv–xv (noting that though gaps remain in the “coverage, 
implementation, and enforcement” of existing laws, the achievement was remarkable); KARL BOYD 
BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970, at 194 
(2009) (noting environmental law’s “unstable legacy” and quoting Mark Twain: “Laws are sand, 
customs are rock”); Tarlock, supra note 57, at 214 (addressing the “Hidden Weaknesses of 
Environmental Law”); see also Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Environmental Policy–It is Time for a New 
Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 120–21 (1989) (reminding us that global environmental 
degradation is a function of growing population, unwise resource consumption, and pollution; some of 
these trends may be beyond the reach of well-written statutes and sympathetic courts). 
 169. Howard Latin, Framing the Climate Change Debate, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER at 
739 (W.H. Rodgers et al. eds, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC.) (forthcoming 2011) (“People are 
now faced in varying degrees by the worst pollution problem of all time, the worst environmental 
problem of all time, and likely the worst human problem of all time.”). 
 170. Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in 2010 CLIMATE CHANGE READER at 
1018, 1023. 
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was planted in the substantive text of NEPA171 until the Supreme Court 
decided it was not there.172 It is insisted, correctly, that the various permit 
systems “were never intended to subvert the goals of the statutes”173 and 
these statutes, to be sure, put their own protective end-points clearly on the 
table.174 But somehow, these articulated intentions slowly succumbed to the 
accumulated malaise of political necessity.175 
It is important, to be sure, to strive for a world where “Protecting 
Nature’s Assets is a Matter of Obligation, Not Discretion.”176 For the most 
part, the environmental statutes sought to do this in the citizen suits that 
anticipated ready enforcement of each and every statutory “shall.” What 
slowedand undidthis arrangement was the U.S. Supreme Court and 
others who had an unduly narrow understanding of what a “mandatory” 
administrative obligation might be.177 
Critics point out that the law must recognize that the “requirements for 
achieving climate equilibrium” are “set by Nature, not politicians.”178 This 
is exactly the aim of the “best science” clauses in the environmental statutes 
of the 1970s. If there is a “slip” here it is not in the shape of the cup but 
twixt the cup and the lip. Courts are too often called upon to flag down 
executive misbehavior to circumvent proper science in the name of “sound 
policy choice.”179 
                                                                                                                           
 171. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). And it appears 
in several natural resource damage provisions, including section 107(a)(4)(C) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(C) (2006). 
 172. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989). 
 173. Wood, supra note 170, at 1023. 
 174. See Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 § 101(a)(1)–(2), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(1)–(2) (daring to reach fishable/swimmable waters by July 1, 1983, and aiming for the 
elimination of the discharge of pollutants by 1985). 
 175. For examples of profound faltering in the reach to achieve statutory environmental goals, 
see Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51 (Mont. 2010), repudiating 
an agency “do nothing” permit that allowed totally unregulated discharges of CBM wastewater into 
surface waters, and Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2010), exhibiting 
courageous judicial intervention and a “Contempt Hearing” for Florida’s nullification (participated in by 
the U.S. EPA) of water quality standards applicable to the Everglades. 
 176. Wood, supra note 170, at 1023. 
 177. For the leading (and most extreme) opinion, see Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), discussed in Crazy Horse, supra note 143. 
 178. Wood, supra note 170, at 1025. 
 179. For a sample, see Rodgers & Mortiz, supra note 73, at 309–13. See also Wild Fish 
Conservancy v. U.S. EPA, No. C08-0156-JCC, 2010 WL 1734850 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2010) 
(illustrating an ESA “best available science” failure where U.S. EPA and NMFS rushed to approve a 
Washington state exemption for salmon farms from general sediment-management water quality 
standards without reference to or mention of massive and detailed regional scientific studies on salmon 
and on the orca). For elaboration, see THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE:  
HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008). 
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Critics emphasize the necessity of “Finding Moral and Economic 
Fortification for the Law” and “Restoring the Role of the Courts.”180 These 
are strikingly important factors, and they are intensely at play in today’s 
environmental law. The environmental laws of the 1970s went so far as to 
presume that courts are ready to discoverand enforcethe environmental 
values expressed in those statutes. We know now that Justice Scalia is not 
Judge Wright,181 and it is the Scalia vision that has been on the march for a 
quarter century. 
Most painful to those with a sympathetic view of the texts and 
traditions of environmental law are the occasions, now on the rise, where 
“environmental” decisions are handed down without appreciation, care, or 
concern about the environmental values at stake. Vandals are especially 
despised because they are heedless of the treasures trod upon. I would put 
in this category Judge O’Scannlain’s recent opinion in Butte Environmental 
Council v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, where it is pointed out 
that this splendid business park built on the vernal pools of Redding, 
California, would destroy only: 
234.5 acres of “critical habitat” of the fairy shrimp (a 
mere .04% of the shrimp’s total critical habitat nationwide); 
234.5 acres of “critical habitat” for the tadpole shrimp (a 
tiny .10% of this shrimp’s critical habitat nationwide); and 
242.2 acres of “critical habitat” of the slender Orcutt grass 
(a mere .26% of the plant’s critical habitat nationwide).182 
Now, if people were involved and their “critical habitat” covered the 
3,531,822 square miles of the U.S. land surface, these percentages 
(.04%, .10%, .26%) would represent 1,412 square miles, 3,531 square miles, 
                                                                                                                           
 180. Wood, supra note 170, at 1034, 1032. 
 181. Scalia, supra note 50, at 884 (mocking the Skelly Wright opinion in Calvert Cliffs 
Coordinating Comm’n v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) that “began the 
judiciary’s long love affair with environmental litigation”). The author excludes himself from this 
liaison.  
 182. Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 607 F.3d 570, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2010). 
For another cold decision by a judicial “umpire” who lacks a sympathetic feeling for the game, see 
United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(Reinhardt, C.J.) (noting that the 2000 Shark Finning Prohibition Act makes it unlawful to be in 
‘‘custody, control, or possession’’ of a shark fin without the corresponding carcass aboard a ‘‘fishing 
vessel,’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1857(l)(P); this forfeiture action against an at-sea buyer who is taking the fins to 
Guatemala fails because the ruthless operator did not have ‘‘fair notice’’ that it would be considered a 
‘‘fishing vessel’’ when it facilitated and advanced this practice). 
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and 9,182 square miles, respectively.183 If .04% of the human habitat were 
lost, a city the size of Winston-Salem, North Carolina would be gone. If the 
figure were .10%, an urban area the size of Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, 
Massachusetts would disappear; if .26%, an urban area the size of Dallas-
Fort Worth-Arlington, Texas (and most of El Paso) would be gone. Now the 
Endangered Species Act is an inspiring text and a profound teacher. But 
even a value-laden statute of that heft, distinction, and notoriety cannot 
move certain appellate judges to recognize activities that “result in the 
destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat.184 That is not an 
error in statutory drafting. Nor is it a commendable display of “humility.” It 
is a casual and hasty repudiation of the values of nonhuman life that were 
captured and expressed in the Endangered Species Act. 
The great contributions of the U.S. environmental laws of the 1970s 
were not in the devices, schemes, arrangements, and incentives of the 
several texts. They are found instead in the stunning compilationand 
expressionof values that redefined the relationship of human beings on 
earth to their world and all life within it. Millions of people have been 
moved by these articulated values, tens of millions of reflections set loose, 
and hundreds of millions of patterns of behavior changed and abandoned. 
While this crop of values was planted and spread, it has simultaneously 
been systematically sacked and repudiated by calculated resort to the U.S. 
political system that auspiciously includes the courts. In this moment of 
irony, loss of judicial support for these environmental values is the ultimate 
double-edged sword. 
There is today a “values” debate over the U.S. environmental laws 
directed and led by a high court that does not share these values. 
Here is a short collection of the inspiring values exhibited by the 
environmental laws of the 1970s: 
1. The Public Trust Doctrine 
This is captured by NEPA185 and still retains great promise as a natural 
resource savior of last resort. 
                                                                                                                           
 183. For the calculations, appreciation is expressed to Lori Fossum, Gallagher Law Library, 
University of Washington, School of Law, for her memorandum on “U.S. human habitat statistics.” 
 184. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1972). 
 185. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1970). 
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2. The Aldo Leopold Alternative 
The ideas of this revolutionary thinker186 are seized upon and elaborated 
in the texts of the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act. In some instances, statutes remove humans from the center 
of the environmental ethics community and put other creatures and places 
there. 
3. The Native American Thought Alternative 
U.S. Indian tribes were not a focus of the environmental laws of the 
1970s. Tribes were ushered in later.187 But while they were waiting for 
admission to the club, the tribes succeeded in writing one of the greatest 
environmental justice stories ever seen on earththe fight of the U.S. 
Pacific Northwest Indian Tribes to enforce their treaty fishing rights. These 
cases rumbled through the federal courts in the 1970s and ended in triumph 
when the treaties landed before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979the 
seventh visit to the high court over a span of eighty years.188 This was a 
vital legal moment in protection of the great anadromous fish runs.189 
4. A Universal Protection of All Physical and Living Resources of 
the Environment 
This is substantive NEPA,190 and it may yet have a legal future. 
                                                                                                                           
 186. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND 
THERE (4th prtg. 1975) (describing Leopold’s land ethic through a collection of essays). 
 187. Compare Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public 
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1218–23 (1991) (emphasizing Leopold’s earth-centered environmental ethics, 
Native American thought, and eco-feminism as alternatives to public trust theory), with William H. 
Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 815, 817–18 (2004) (outlining the decision to treat tribes as states to make them subject to 
the Clean Water Act). 
 188. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 433 U.S. 658, 
684–85 (1979). The seven Supreme Court decisions are identified in LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra 
note 8, at 24 n.12, and elaborated on in J.C. DUPRIS, KATHLEEN S. HILL & WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 
THE SI’LAILO WAY: INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE COLUMBIA  RIVER (2006). 
 189. See LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 8, at 61–86 (describing the “environmental 
reserved rights” aspects of the treaties). 
 190. National Environmental Policy Act § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331; see Clean Air Act § 309(b), 
42 U.S.C. § 7609(b) (according the Administrator of EPA the authority to adjudge various federal 
actions “unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or welfare”). 
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5. No Significant Deterioration 
This idea was casually introduced by the Clean Air Act191 and then 
elaborately codified by Congress. 192  It has been cheapened, but not 
destroyed, by a new wave of judicial thinkers who have applied their 
ignorance and “humility” to the matter. 
6. Technology-Forcing 
This idea originated in the great smog conspiracy case of the 1960s193 
that put limits on technology-fixing, forum-stone-walling, and conspiracies 
of silence preferred by the trade association of the auto manufacturers. Its 
centerpiece was a ninety percent emissions reduction for autos. 194  This 
history has been largely forgotten by the practitioners of “humility” on 
today’s Supreme Court.195 
7. Technology Assessment 
This is another NEPA triumph.196 However, it struggles to maintain its 
integrity in today’s judicial world.197 
8. Precautionary Principle 
This principle is expressed in NEPA198 and it lives on in other legal 
contexts.199 
                                                                                                                           
 191. Courts found it in the declaration of purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation’s air resources.” Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
 192. Clean Air Act §§ 171–193, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501–15 (2006).  
 193. See 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 23, at 393–96 (discussing “Technology-Forcing and 
Technology-Suppressing”). 
 194. See id. at 386–88 (discussing the 1970 and 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act). 
 195. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2010) (5-3 decision), criticized in 1 AIR 
AND WATER, supra note 23 (Supp. 2010). 
 196. National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 906 (2002) (offering a critical elaboration on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)). 
 197. The high court’s recent decisions in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S.Ct. 
365, 370 (2008), and Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010), are NEPA-
remedy rollbacks and containments. They reek of “leap before you look.” 
 198. LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 8, at 382–86. 
 199. Judge Skelly Wright would have been as pleased as punch with the recent ruling in 
Coalition of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding, on precautionary 
grounds, the latest revision tightening the NAAQS for lead). 
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9. Public Disclosure of Corporate Influence 
This was the aim of FACA200 but the push-back has been swift and 
sure.201 
10. Active Enforcement by Citizens 
Court-invented barriers have raised transaction costs and taken the 
profit out of this business. But “economic incentives” alone are not the 
whole story. Skeptics should review the efforts of Law Prof. Jerry Anderson 
in Northeast Iowa Citizens for Clean Water v. Agriprocessors, Inc. 202 
Citizen enforcement may well be a legal clock that cannot be turned back. 
11. Sustainability 
This is a huge world that has swept beyond the environmental laws of 
the 1970s.203 But you can still see it, as you can see much of the future, in 
the buried text of NEPA.204 
12. Integration 
NEPA, again, achieved what few laws do and made the case against 
fragmentation, single-media approaches, and single-shot solutions.205 It is a 
magnificent how-to-do-it manual: 
encouraging better recognition of the primary causes and 
not just the symptoms of pollution; avoiding “solutions” 
                                                                                                                           
 200. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The National Industrial Pollution Control Council: Advise or 
Collude?, 13 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 719 (1972) (noting that NIPCC was the problem FACA was 
invented to solve). 
 201. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 384–85 (2004) (noting that even 
if FACA authorizes review of executive branch documents, requiring the executive branch to turn over 
these documents may constitute a violation of separation of powers). 
 202. Northeast. Iowa Citizens for Clean Water v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 881, 886, 
899, 901 (N.D. Iowa 2007). For a valuable text, see JOEL A. MINTZ, CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & 
ROBERT KUEHN, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CASES & MATERIALS ch. 7 (2007). 
 203. See John C. Dernbach, Citizen Suits and Sustainability, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 503 (2004) 
(exhibiting impressive heavy-lifting on this issue by Professor John Dernbach). 
 204. See National Environmental Policy Act § 101(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(6) (asserting that 
it is the continuing responsibility of the federal government to “enhance the quality of renewable 
resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources”); see also Daniel A. 
Farber, Taking Responsibility for the Planet, 89 TEX. L. REV. 147 (2010), available at 
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/issues/vol89/pdf/Farber.pdf (reviewing DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, 
REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010)). 
 205. LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 8, at 387. 
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that transfer pollutants to other media; drawing attention to 
pollution prevention; bringing about a better accounting of 
multiple exposures; reducing the friction costs occasioned 
by complexity and frequent definitions at the boundaries.206 
13. Natural Resource Damages 
This innovation deserves a separate accolade, especially when one 
realizes it drifts close to an “eye-for-an-eye” morality in declaring that 
natural resources “damaged or destroyed” are to be resurrected by 
expenditures to “restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent” of that 
which was lost.207 This goes farther than the pay-as-you-go conventions of 
customary tort law and invites creative methods for evaluating losses and 
correcting them. 
The environmental laws of the 1970s were bold, ambitious, often 
inspired, and they looked good on paper. 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 206. Id. The 1979 CEQ rules, a triumph of organized common-sense, furthered NEPA’s success 
as a policy template. 
 207. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 311(f)(4)–(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4)–(5) (including in 
liability for an oil spill the costs and expenses incurred by government in the restoration or replacement 
of natural resources). 
